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The fast-growing use of machine-learning and artificial intelligence techniques opens up new 
horizons in terms of accuracy, efficiency and rapidity in everyday life applications. Artificial 
intelligence (AI) applications in fact play an increasingly important role in organising society 
at large, in the regulation of a wide variety of social systems and infrastructures and even in 
shaping human interactions and preferences. 3  Examples range from ‘Internet of Things’ 
applications to commercial nudging, from speech performance to face recognition software, 
from automated crime prediction to credit scoring systems, and from AI-powered cars to 
diagnosing tools in the healthcare sector, to cite just a few. Algorithmic applications therefore 
influence how opportunities and possibilities open up for, and are accessed by, individuals and 
entire groups of populations, or by contrast, how they close up. While AI can potentially 
provide society at large with a broader and more equal access to a wide range of goods and 
services, voices have emerged that also point at unprecedented risks of discrimination.4 Many 
concrete examples relayed by the media show how grave, pervasive and multi-facetted the 
problem of algorithmic discrimination can be: face recognition applications perform much 
worse at recognising black women’s faces than at white men’s5; predictive policing algorithms 
prove to be racist6; and Tay.AI, a chatbot launched by Microsoft in 2016 had to be turned down 
after 24 hours because it had turned into a racist and sexist online hate speech machine7. 
Automated operations empowered by algorithms risk perpetuating, and thereby solidifying, a 
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status quo that is deeply discriminatory. The consequences on citizens’ daily life are tangible, 
endangering the exercise of their fundamental rights as well as reinforcing social hierarchies 
and material inequalities.  
 
The way these digital technologies operate, the data they use and the way they process it as well 
as the output they produce thus need to be scrutinised and tested against the values and 
principles that organise the social contract and the legal rules that formalise it. Whole strands 
of literature on algorithmic fairness have rapidly developed and the question of ‘algorithmic 
bias’ has now become central to research in this area. As this book shows, lawyers too have 
started to grapple with the digital reality and its consequences for the rule of law, the established 
legal order and general principles of law. This chapter explores the question of the robustness 
of the legal protection framework in place in the EU in front of the risks of discrimination that 
arise from using these technologies. The aim is to map the main challenges that arise at the 
intersection of non-discrimination law and technological developments, with a particular focus 
on one area of artificial intelligence, namely machine learning algorithms. 
 
While most studies on the topic of artificial intelligence, algorithms and bias have been 
conducted from the point of view of ‘fairness’ in the field of information technologies and 
computer science 8 , this chapter explores the question of algorithmic discrimination — a 
category that does not neatly overlap with algorithmic bias — from the specific perspective of 
non-discrimination law. In particular and by contrast to the majority of current research on the 
question of algorithms and discrimination, which focuses on the US context, this chapter takes 
EU non-discrimination law as its object of inquiry. We pose the question of the resilience of 
the general principle of non-discrimination, that is the capacity for EU equality law to respond 
effectively to the specific challenges posed by algorithmic discrimination. Because EU law 
represents an overarching framework and sets minimum safeguards for the protection against 
discrimination at national level in EU member states, it is important to test out the protection 
against the risks posed by the pervasive and increasing use of artificial intelligence techniques 
in everyday life applications which this framework allows for. This chapter therefore focuses 
on the question on how technological developments in the field of artificial intelligence impact 
on the right not to be discriminated against, which is both a general principle and a fundamental 
right in EU law.  
 
The central purpose of this chapter is thus to map the challenges which these digital 
developments entail in the light of the EU principle of non-discrimination. In so doing, we hope 
to lay the foundations of a new research agenda at the intersection of EU non-discrimination 
law and technology. In particular, we propose a mapping of the frictions, mismatches and 
difficulties arising at the contact points between the growing use of AI, and notably machine 
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learning algorithms, in decision-making procedures and the protective framework offered by 
EU non-discrimination law. The picture we paint is not monochrome and we contend that AI 
also offers pathways towards less discriminatory decision-making and opens up opportunities 
to increase awareness of, and tackle, the current discriminatory status quo. Likewise, we also 
contend that EU non-discrimination law offers potential pathways to deal with algorithmic 
discrimination which are so far little used and worthwhile exploring further. We proceed in four 
steps. First, we identify the specific risks of discrimination that AI-based decision-making, and 
in particular machine-learning algorithms, pose. Second, we review how EU non-
discrimination law can capture algorithmic discrimination in terms of its substantive scope. 
Third, we conduct this review from a conceptual perspective, mapping the friction points that 
emerge from the viewpoint of the EU concepts of direct and indirect discrimination, as 
developed by the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU). In the final step, we identify the core 
challenges algorithmic discrimination poses at the enforcement level, and propose potential 
ways forward. 
 
I The mechanics of algorithmic discrimination 
 
I. 1. Artificial intelligence, machine-learning and algorithms 
 
Even though artificial intelligence is a very broad field, it can be roughly defined as 
encompassing a set of technologies seeking to “make computers do the sorts of things that 
[human] minds can do”.9 To do so, machines rely on sets of rules called algorithms. Algorithms 
are mathematical instructions that aim to solve problems, answer questions or perform specific 
tasks. They can be very simple, for instance specifying that if a condition A is met an outcome 
B should follow, or very complex, combining multiple sets of rules towards building a whole 
system. One complex class of algorithms perform what is called machine-learning, that is the 
“ability [for machines] to acquire their own knowledge, by extracting patterns from raw data”.10 
While automation can pose challenges in themselves by leading to the generalisation of 
discriminatory rules on a larger scale than would be the case with human beings, the operation 
of machine-learning algorithms is, however, of much greater concern.  
 
Because machine-learning has the ability to learn and discover correlations in any given dataset, 
the risk of discrimination is greater. Even when not instructed to discriminate, machine-learning 
algorithms have been found producing discriminatory outcomes. Besides just automation of 
discrimination, machine-learning techniques pose the additional risk of reproducing existing 
patterns of inequality in ways unintended by their designers. By way of illustration, a machine-
learning algorithm designed to decide about workplace promotions and relying on past 
successful applicants’ data could be made blind to applicants’ gender and still be discriminatory 
against female applicants, for instance if asked to select candidates based on an assessment of 
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their performance at work that would include their average working hours.11 Women would for 
instance be disadvantaged because they disproportionately carry the burden of caregiving 
according to typical gender roles in society, thus working less hours or more part-time.12 The 
challenge with machine learning is that algorithms are not only at risk of conveying human 
biases in their operation – they are also a vehicle for reproducing inequality patterns that are 
structurally engrained in the data they process. In view of these challenges, machine-learning 
algorithms are the point of focus of this chapter. While a great variety of such algorithms exist 
as well as different learning procedures, the scope of this chapter only allows us to adopt a 
general focus.13 
 
I. 2. What risks of discrimination do machine-learning algorithms pose? 
  
Algorithmic decision-making has been described as the new “regulatory frontier” inter alia for 
non-discrimination law and equality protection.14 Discrimination can infect machine-learning 
algorithms at several entry points. In order to operate, an algorithm needs two elements: a code 
that formalises a problem in mathematical terms; and data, that is a set of input variables that 
the machine can learn from. Several typologies have been proposed in the literature to describe 
how either the code or the data can be biased, thus injecting discrimination into algorithmic 
operations. Kleinberg et al. identify risks of discrimination in the choice of outcome that is 
entrusted to the algorithm, in the selection of input information used to train it (what they call 
“candidate predictors”) and in the training procedure used, including the training data.15  
 
Barocas and Selbst also propose a five-tier taxonomy of the sources of discrimination. Their 
first entry point corresponds to outcome definition, or what the authors call “problem 
definition” through the construction of “target variables”, themselves broken down into “class 
labels”.16 The second entry point is the training data used for the learning process, which can 
be biased either because of the way it has been collected or because the data itself is biased and 
is then relied on to teach the algorithm.17 A third entry point is the selection of relevant features 
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for the model, that is, what attributes should be considered relevant in the algorithmic model. 
A fourth entry point is “proxy discrimination”, where discrimination arises from so-called 
“redundant encodings”, i.e. “cases in which membership in a protected class happens to be 
encoded in other data” which is considered correlated to the outcome by the algorithm.18 A 
typical example would be the use of a non-protected category (e.g. residence or zip code) as a 
proxy for a protected category (e.g. race). A fifth and last entry point they identify is the 
masking of intentional discrimination, which programmers can hide in the architecture of the 
algorithm.  
 
Hacker reduces these sources of discrimination to two main entry points. “Biased training data” 
covers situations where the training data is either incorrectly handled, for instance when the 
correct answer taught to the machine is biased, or skewed because of historical discrimination. 
19 “Unequal ground truth” corresponds to situations where the “best available approximation of 
reality” (or empirically observable data) is not equal between groups — for instance, if risks of 
car crash are higher among men than among women. Since measuring risks is highly complex 
and costly for insurance policy providers, the groups themselves (men and women) can be used 
as proxies to compensate the lack of more granular information.20 This explains why gender 
has been used as a proxy for a long time before the landmark Test-Achats decision of the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in 2011.21 While this is now prohibited in the EU, 
there is a risk that machine learning uses other indirect proxies (such as tastes and behaviours) 
that are correlated with protected proxies to estimate risks. This would be the case for example 
if tastes for certain types of sports or cars that are held prevailingly by men are used to estimate 
given risks in the insurance sector. 
 
I. 3. Bias through the lens of non-discrimination law: demystifying algorithmic 
discrimination 
 
Despite the risks highlighted above, the discriminatory potential of machine-learning 
algorithms should not be mystified.22  First, discriminating (in the broad sense) is part of 
continuous operation of algorithms. From a legal point of view, it is not a problem in itself: the 
problem only arises when algorithms discriminate based on legally protected categories. In the 
context of EU law, these protected categories are sex, race or ethnic origin, as well as disability, 
age, sexual orientation and religion or belief.23 Nationality is also covered in particular cases, 
including in relation to the freedom of movement of persons, goods, services and capital.24 
Second, and perhaps most importantly from a non-discrimination law perspective, algorithms 
reinforce and propagate patterns of inequality that already exist in the social fabric. A well-
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known adage among computer scientists – “garbage in, garbage out” – conveys the idea that 
any discriminatory algorithmic output comes from bias injected into algorithms by human 
beings.25 In other words, and as reframed by Mayson, “bias in, bias out”.26  
 
From the point of view of discrimination theory, the sources of algorithmic discrimination can 
be categorised into two overarching types of inequality (re-)producing mechanisms.27 On the 
one hand, stereotyping and prejudice affect the equal representation of groups in society. On 
the other, past discrimination that has been institutionalised and reified over the course of 
history is reflected in structural forms of inequality. Algorithmic discrimination has the 
potential to reinforce both distributive inequality by maintaining discriminatory access to social 
goods (e.g. labour, health services, social benefits, exercise of rights, etc.) and symbolic 
inequality by misrepresenting or rendering invisible certain groups of population (e.g. search 
engines returning sexualised images of black women).28 Algorithmic discrimination therefore 
both arises from, and further entrenches, hierarchising status beliefs and stereotypes as well as 
structural institutionalised patterns of inequality. From the perspective of discrimination law, 
the mechanisms through which discrimination might invade algorithms can thus be classified 
along these two main axes.29 
 
I.3.1 Stereotyping in framing, labelling and modelling 
Difference and social divisions are associated with (negative or positive) stereotypes in human 
cognitive schemes, which contribute to solidifying and maintaining social hierarchies over 
time. 30  There are several ways in which bias can pervade algorithmic design during the 
developing process. It is possible, for instance, that a software reflects the biases and stereotypes 
that are held by its developers.31 This can be done intentionally, but mostly prejudice will be 
implicit. Stereotyping can influence the framing of the problem posed, and of the output looked 
for. For instance, if an algorithm is developed to find out who is the best candidate, the output 
will likely vary according to the definition given to ‘best’. If the definition of ‘best’ ascribes 
great weight to so-called leadership skills, the output is likely to discriminate against female 
candidates, leadership often being stereotypically conceived of as a male characteristic32 and 
stressing abilities and qualities that are usually typified as ‘male’, such as being ambitious, 
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forceful, self-sufficient and self-confident.33 Stereotypes and prejudices can also impact the 
labelling process. For instance, if white men wearing a white overall are likely to be categorised 
as doctors, women wearing the same dress will more likely be identified as nurses. 34 
Externalising data labelling to internet users through microwork platforms like Mechanical 
Turk or captcha-based services like reCaptcha might lead to prejudiced outcomes on yet a 
bigger scale. 
 
Stereotyping also happens where the lack of information about the features of a certain group 
creates uncertainty. Some proxies might yield a high level of predictive accuracy but at the 
same time be discriminatory. This is because, despite its general statistical relevance, the use 
of this feature is unfair at the individual level. In particular, in the absence of perfect information 
or more granular data and in front of the cost of obtaining such data, stereotypes and 
generalisations regarding certain groups of population might be relied on as a way to 
approximate reality. As mentioned above, until the Test-Achats case, insurers for instance used 
gender as a proxy (an actuarial factor) to calculate risks and thus estimate premiums in the 
absence of granular information about individuals.35 Group stereotyping reduces uncertainty 
but might also create “unsound generalizations [that] may deny members of these populations 
the opportunity to prove that they buck the apparent trend” or that the stereotype is unfounded.36 
Stereotyping is problematic because it can have performative effects, that is reinforce and 
enhance discrimination and inequality. 37  Research has for instance shown that gender 
stereotypes and unequal gender representation in online image searches influence users’ 
perceptions of the real world and thus their representation of certain professions as typically 
male or female.38 
 
I.3.2 Structural discrimination engrained in data 
Structural discrimination, which is the product of past discrimination institutionalised over time 
and now reflected in many ways in the organisation of society, is mirrored in data. In particular, 
structural discrimination engrained in training data will prove problematic. First, if this data 
accurately represents reality, it could still reflect structural inequalities which machine learning 
algorithms would then reproduce. The danger is that discrimination manifested in statistical 
correlations becomes further reified by algorithms, entrenching exclusion and inequality. For 
instance, if an algorithm is trained using a dataset gathering all employees hired in the past in 
                                               
33  See Alice Eagly and Steven Karau, ‘Role Congruity Theory of Prejudice Toward Female Leaders’, 
Psychological Review 2006, vol. 109, No. 3, 573-598, at 574. 
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Computing Systems. 
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order to predict which employees should be hired in the future based on their potential 
performance, it might reproduce discrimination against women and overwhelmingly correlate 
the male gender to expected job performance.39  This is because past hiring decisions are 
infected with discriminatory gender stereotypes that will be reproduced by the algorithm. In a 
more diffuse way, language itself is a “naturally skewed data”.40 Because language reflects our 
representation of the world, which is deeply hierarchical and biased, it is also a vector of 
structurally engrained discrimination, the patterns of which will be reproduced by machine-
learning algorithms if not addressed.41 Research has for instance shown how natural language 
processing systems “exhibit gender bias mirroring stereotypical gender associations” such as 
“Man is to computer programmer as Woman is to homemaker”, thereby “pick[ing[ up on 
historical biases encoded in their training corpus”.42 This shows how gender inequality, and in 
particular stereotypical gender roles (female homemaker vs. male breadwinner) are deeply 
embedded in various types of data. 
 
It could be, moreover, that data collection and selection itself is skewed and misrepresents 
reality. For instance, collecting data from all those who have an internet connection might 
exclude poor or rural populations, who will then not be represented at all in the sample used to 
train algorithms. In the same vein, the project ‘The Coded Gaze’, hosted at MIT, reveals how 
training data in which black women are under-represented leads to face recognition software 
being less performant on recognizing black women’s faces while performing much better on 
black and white men’s faces as well as white women’s faces.43 This example shows how 
machine-learning algorithms can put certain groups of population at a disadvantage through 
reproducing structural discrimination. The ‘Gender Shades’ study reveals how some of the 
datasets chosen to train face recognition devices are biased, as is the case of a dataset of 
celebrity faces containing 77,5% male faces and 83,5% white faces, leading to 
underperformance in relation to the underrepresented categories of population.44  If a face 
recognition software was trained on randomly selected datasets containing the faces of public 
political figures, e.g. members of parliaments, the selection would also be biased as it would 
reflect the structurally unequal access to politics for men and women, and in particular women 
from racialised minorities, in many countries.45 This lack of representation of certain groups of 
populations is problematic because it leads the algorithm to ‘unsee’ them, thus making them 
invisible. The learning being based on past discrimination, inequality is reproduced by 
                                               
39 See for instance Amazon’s hiring algorithm: Dastin, 'Amazon scraps secret AI recruiting tool that showed bias 
against women'. 
40 See Aylin Caliskan, Joanna J. Bryson and Arvind Narayanan, 'Semantics derived automatically from language 
corpora contain human-like biases' (2017) 356 Science.  
41 Kaiji Lu and others, Gender Bias in Neural Natural Language Processing (2018). 
42 See Lu and others, Gender Bias in Neural Natural Language Processing 2-3 and T. Bolukbasi and others, 'Man 
is to computer programmer as woman is to homemaker? Debiasing word embeddings' (2016) Advances in Neural 
Information Processing Systems 4356. 
43 See The Coded Gaze: https://www.ajlunited.org/the-coded-gaze. See also Buolamwini and Gebru, Gender 
Shades: Intersectional Accuracy Disparities in Commercial Gender Classification. 
44 See , 3. 
45 This is why the researchers of the above-mentioned study carefully selected datasets from various countries to 
reflect a wide spectrum of skin tones, and chose Parliaments were the gender parity was highest in order to avoid 
reproducing structural discrimination through algorithmic bias. See Buolamwini and Gebru, Gender Shades: 
Intersectional Accuracy Disparities in Commercial Gender Classification, 5-6. 
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machines, in this case ignoring further the existence of black women in the public sphere by 
denying them visibility. Such erasure could lead to extremely grave discriminatory 
consequences if built in other technologies such as healthcare services or automated cars. 
 
Finally, because a model always approximates reality, it uses proxies that are generalisable: 
“Indeed, the very point […] is to provide a rational basis upon which to distinguish between 
individuals and to reliably confer to the individual the qualities possessed by those who seem 
statistically similar”.46 Some of these proxies might be statistically accurate predictors but at 
the same time embed structural discrimination and thus reproduce inequality. On the one hand, 
banning protected categories from the data available to machine learning algorithms does not 
prevent discriminatory outcomes, as machines use non-protected data as proxies for these 
categories.47  On the other hand, refining granularity so as to find a feature that performs as 
good or better but at the same time does not lead to unfair generalisations about a protected 
group might be costly. For example, proxies such as the reputation of the schools from which 
candidates graduated, despite being unfair to candidates from minorities and not adequately 
reflecting a person’s actual job-related skills, are used because they allow to reduce uncertainty 
in front of otherwise difficultly measurable items (e.g. work performance potential) by 
substituting them with easily accessible and low cost information.48 Choosing such proxies 
might however lead to so-called ”redundant encoding” or “feedback effect”, that is the 
reification and essentialisation of false correlations inherited from past discrimination into the 
present.49 In other words, inequalities that have been socially constructed over time through 
accumulated past discrimination become considered ‘natural properties’ of certain groups of 
population. The effect is performative: taking inequality into account as a relevant group 
characteristic in present decisions about disadvantaged groups further contributes to 
systematically depriving these groups from equal opportunities. In the example above, the 
under-representation of minority candidates in elite graduate schools is institutionalised as a 
valid selection rule by the algorithm and reproduced, thus further entrenching inequality. 
 
 
The consequences of machine-learning algorithms in relation to bias and data-driven inequality 
in terms of automation, reproduction and even performativity of discrimination are therefore 
grave and it is essential to evaluate whether non-discrimination laws in place are fit to prevent 
and redress them. This is our agenda for the next sections. 
 
II The applicability of the current EU non-discrimination law regime to cases of 
algorithmic discrimination 
 
This section explores the new challenges machine-learning algorithms pose in the specific 
context of the protection EU law offers against discrimination. It probes the robustness of the 
                                               
46 Barocas and Selbst, 'Big Data's Disparate Impact', 677. 
47 See Betsy Anne Williams, Catherine F. Brooks and Yotam Shmargad, 'How Algorithms Discriminate Based on 
Data They Lack: Challenges, Solutions, and Policy Implications' (2018) 8 Journal of Information Policy . 
48 See Barocas and Selbst, 'Big Data's Disparate Impact'. 
49 Kim, 'Data-Driven Discrimination at Work'. 
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legal framework against situations of algorithmic discrimination that are likely to arise in the 
context of current machine learning applications. 
 
The general principle of non-discrimination in EU law finds expression in a set of primary and 
secondary legal provisions protecting people from discrimination based on their sex, race or 
ethnic origin, disabilities, religion or belief, age and sexual orientation. Nationality is protected 
in certain areas of EU law too.50  The personal scope of these provisions covers workers 
(Directives 2006/54/EC for the ground of sex – hereinafter the Gender Recast Directive, 
Directive 2000/43/EC for the ground of race or ethnic origin – hereinafter the Race Equality 
Directive and Directive 2000/78/EC for the grounds of disabilities, religion or belief, age and 
sexual orientation – hereinafter the Employment Equality Directive). In the case of sex 
(Directive 2004/113/EC – hereinafter the Gender Goods and Services Directives) and race or 
ethnic origin certain cases (Race Equality Directive 2000/43/EC) consumers and service 
providers are covered too. The material scope of the EU general principle of non-discrimination 
therefore spans the labour market, where the protection is at its widest, and the consumption 
market, where it is more limited.51 
 
II. 1. Algorithmic discrimination in the labour market 
 
The first and most extensive field in which EU non-discrimination legislation has been 
deployed is employment and labour relations. 
 
II.1.1 Equal pay 
Historically, the principle of equal pay, now enshrined in Art. 157 TFEU and Article 4 of 
Directive 2006/54/EC, foresees that women and men should be paid equally when performing 
equal work and work of equal value. While the implementation of this principle is still 
challenging in non-digital sectors, this is even truer in the digital economy, especially for on-
demand services.52 Empirical studies on platform work show that the hourly income of women 
averages to thirds of men’s hourly wage.53 In the case of driving services, for instance, drivers’ 
pay depends on their evaluation by an algorithm that computes their score using features such 
as their availability rate and clients’ ratings. The use of these features channels both stereotypes 
and structural inequalities into the scoring process. Citing Uber as an example, Küllman for 
instance exposes how stereotypes about the non-reliability of women could influence clients’ 
ratings and feed into the overall evaluation of drivers and thus into the calculation of their pay, 
disadvantaging female workers.54 By analogy, if drivers were considered to be employees, this 
situation would potentially amount to discrimination in light of the CJEU’s jurisprudence in 
                                               
50 See Art. 18 TFEU. 
51 This also covers social protection in the case of gender and race. 
52 November 6th is the date that symbolises the average gender pay gap in the EU each year, by marking the day 
where women stop being paid until December 31st each year. 
53 See Arianne Renan Barzilay and Anat Ben-David, 'Platform Inequality: Gender in the Gig-Economy' (2017) 47 
Seton Hall law review 393. 
54 See Kullmann, 'Platform Work, Algorithmic Decision-Making, and EU Gender Equality Law'. 
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Bougnaoui.55 In this case, the Court explained that clients’ preferences regarding dealing with 
an employee who did not wear a hijab could not be considered a genuine and occupational 
requirement and thus could not justify discrimination on the basis of religion. Following the 
same reasoning, prejudiced preferences expressed by clients in ratings should not lawfully 
inform workers’ pay and influence their working conditions in discriminatory ways.  
 
Another feature that might influence the algorithm that calculates drivers’ pay is their 
availability rate, which might disadvantage women who generally carry most of the burden of 
care duties.56 Here again, the gendered organisation of society might weight negatively in 
algorithmic scoring, infringing on the principle of equal pay and thus indirectly discriminating 
against women. By analogy, the CJEU case law on part-time work, notably in Bilka-Kaufhaus, 
has made clear that excluding part-time workers from certain segments of pay or benefits could 
amount to indirect sex discrimination if “a far greater number of women than men” are impacted 
by the exclusion. 57  This casts doubts as regards the lawfulness of algorithmic scoring to 
calculate pay when it affects certain protected categories such as gender in a disproportionately 
disadvantageous way. 
 
In both cases, gender is not a feature inputted in the algorithmic decision-making procedure, 
but still works to the structural disadvantage of female workers. EU non-discrimination law 
covers these situations and thus seems fit to address such types of algorithmic discrimination. 
However, the application of the equal pay principle in this regard highly depends on whether 
the relationship between gig economy platforms and companies on the one hand and workers 
on the other can be called an employment relationship from the point of view of EU law.58 The 
scope of the principle of equal pay in fact seems to exclude service providers who are genuine 
self-employed workers.59 
 
II.1.2 Employment: hiring, promotion and working conditions 
Another configuration of the general principle of non-discrimination is its translation into a 
prohibition of discrimination on grounds of gender (Gender Recast Directive 2006/54/EC), race 
and ethnic origin (Race Equality Directive 2000/43/EC), disability, sexual orientation, religion 
or belief and age (Employment Equality Directive 2000/78/EC) in recruitment procedures, 
promotions, working conditions and professional training. Hiring and promotion procedures 
perhaps illustrate best the risk algorithmic decision-making poses with regard to the 
perpetuation of inequalities. Some digital human resources services have specialized in offering 
                                               
55  C-188/15 Asma Bougnaoui and Association de défense des droits de l’homme (ADDH) v Micropole SA 
EU:C:2017:204. 
56 See Kullmann, 'Platform Work, Algorithmic Decision-Making, and EU Gender Equality Law'. 
57 C-170/84 Bilka - Kaufhaus GmbH v Karin Weber von Hartz EU:C:1986:204. 
58 This is a question which national courts have been recently confronted with: see the UK decision Uber B.V. v 
Aslam and others [2018] EWCA Civ 2748 and the French decision CA Paris, 6-2, 10 January 2019 confirming 
that Uber drivers are workers. However, ‘bogus’ or economically dependent self-employed workers, despite being 
classified as self-workers under national law, might be regarded as workers under EU law as ruled by the CJEU 
in Allonby, thus extending the application of the equal pay principle to platform workers. See C-256/01 Debra 
Allonby v Accrington & Rossendale College, Education Lecturing Services, trading as Protocol Professional and 
Secretary of State for Education and Employment EU:C:2004:18.  
59 Kullmann, 'Platform Work, Algorithmic Decision-Making, and EU Gender Equality Law', 16-17. 
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companies scoring methods evaluating which employees perform best and should thus progress 
towards higher-ranked positions. Amazon for instance had to renounce to an algorithmic model 
that systematically discriminated against female and racialized employees. 60  The ‘smart’ 
algorithm that would screen and rank employees had been trained on datasets that featured the 
profiles of employees promoted in the past. Although gender and race were not part of the set 
of variables inputted in the model, the machine-learned algorithm considered that these features 
correlated with candidates’ performance. Inevitably, the training data used in machine learning 
reflects past discrimination and is the product of human bias in relation to protected categories 
in past decisions about which employees to promote.  
 
In the same vein, machine-learning algorithms are found to discriminate against members of 
protected categories when used in the context of hiring procedures. Of course, it is unlawful to 
input protected criteria as relevant variables in the model. This could be captured as direct 
discrimination under EU non-discrimination law. As mentioned earlier, even when algorithms 
are blinded to sensitive information about membership in protected categories, existing 
correlations in training data might still produce discriminatory outcomes in unintended ways.61 
Kim for instance explains the case of a machine learning algorithm that used the distance 
between workers’ home and workplace “as a predictor of employee job tenure”, which first 
appeared benign, but in fact proved discriminatory “because […] housing patterns are 
correlated with race”.62 Identifying a particular geographic area as structurally disadvantaged, 
with lower levels of education and economic activity on average, the algorithm gave a 
disadvantageous score to its residents, who in fact mostly belonged to a racialized group.  
 
Following Article 2(1)(b) of Directive 2006/54/EC and Article 2(2)(b) of Directive 2000/43/EC 
and 2000/78/EC, both cases are likely to amount to indirect discrimination under EU law 
because they put bearers of protected characteristics at a disproportionate disadvantage even 
though this was not intended. In addition, the concept of discrimination by association which 
the CJEU developed in Coleman and CHEZ would strengthen the level of protection afforded 
by EU law.63 This concept could in fact cover cases of algorithmic misclassification: because 
the level of granularity of an algorithm might not extend to the individual level, some 
individuals who are not members of protected groups could be associated with these groups 
and misclassified. Following the CJEU’s jurisprudence, they would be afforded the same level 
of legal protection as members of protected groups themselves. This scenario would be similar 
to CHEZ (2014) in the area of goods and services, where the resident of a ‘racialised’ area 
mostly populated by Roma people was excluded from accessing certain electricity services 
based on the racist stereotypes which the company held against the Roma population of this 
area.64 The company, explaining that it feared electricity theft in the area, installed electricity 
meters so high that clients could not reach them to control their electricity consumption. The 
                                               
60 See Dastin, 'Amazon scraps secret AI recruiting tool that showed bias against women'. 
61 See Williams, Brooks and Shmargad, 'How Algorithms Discriminate Based on Data They Lack: Challenges, 
Solutions, and Policy Implications'. 
62 Kim, 'Data-Driven Discrimination at Work', 873. 
63 C-303/06 S. Coleman v Attridge Law and Steve Law EU:C:2008:415 and C-83/14 CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria 
AD contre Komisia za zashtita ot diskriminatsia EU:C:2015:480. 
64 C-83/14 "CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria" AD v Komisia za zashtita ot diskriminatsia EU:C:2015:480. 
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applicant in CHEZ was not of Roma origin herself but the CJEU held that she was the victim 
of the racist stereotypes and ascriptions that targeted her neighbourhood. More generally, the 
analysis the CJEU performed in CHEZ could also be a source of inspiration to tackle proxy-
based algorithmic discrimination. This should be taken in combination with Coleman, an 
employment case in which the mother of a disabled child claimed to have been harassed and 
otherwise discriminated against as her employer refused her time off work and flexible working 
arrangements to care for her child. In Coleman, the CJEU recognised that is “the prohibition of 
direct discrimination […] is not limited only to people who are themselves disabled” but extend 
to people who are associated with disabled persons, e.g. their caregivers. Therefore, with regard 
to such employment-related cases of algorithmic discrimination the current EU law regime 
seems to provide some useful yardsticks. 
 
II.1.3 Algorithmic stereotyping in job ads and opportunities 
Algorithms are used to advertise job openings, in particular through online platforms for ad 
delivery such as Facebook. With the collection of more and more personal data and the 
personalisation of online ads based on collected data, the issue of discrimination prompted by 
algorithmic profiling in advertisement becomes pressing. Recent studies have shown that 
substantial risks exist that targeted advertising of job positions end up discriminating against 
users as well as reinforcing stereotypical labour divisions in society. Most telling are the results 
ensuing from Ali et al.’s experiment, revealing that employment ads set to target the same 
audience and delivered by Facebook ended up reaching an 85% female audience for cashier 
positions in supermarkets, while taxi driver positions reached a 75% black audience and 
lumberjack positions an audience that was male at 90% and white at 72%.65 Algorithmic 
profiling, by multiplying the possibilities for targeted advertising, therefore pose the question 
of discrimination and the protection EU law can offer. 
 
Because job advertising is part of the recruitment process, it falls within the scope of 
employment and is thus covered by the Gender Recast Directive, the Employment Equality 
Directive and the Race Equality Directive.66 These directives in fact apply to “conditions for 
access to employment […] including selection criteria and recruitment conditions”.67  The 
protection EU non-discrimination law affords on grounds of gender, race, sexual orientation, 
age, religion or belief and disability should thus be understood to cover cases in which job-
related ads are delivered in discriminatory ways, perpetuating stereotypes and reinforcing 
existing patterns of structural discrimination. Algorithmic discrimination in job-related 
advertising could be compared to the situations which the CJEU dealt with in ACCEPT and 
Feryn. 68  In these cases, the Court deemed discriminatory statements made in public by 
employers, respectively on grounds of sexual orientation and ethnic origin, to fall within the 
                                               
65 Muhammad Ali and others, 'Discrimination through optimization: How Facebook's ad delivery can lead to 
skewed outcomes' (2019) available at https://arxivorg/abs/190402095 . 
66 See Paul Post and Rikki Holtmaat, 'A False Start: Discrimination in Job Advertisements' (2014) 2 European 
Gender Equality Law Review 12, 13. 
67 Art. 14(1)(a) of Directive 2006/54/EC; Art. 3(1)(a) of Directive 200/43/EC and Directive 2000/78/EC. 
68 See C-54/07 Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding v Firma Feryn NV EU:C:2008:397 
and C-81/12 Asociaţia Accept v Consiliul Naţional pentru Combaterea Discriminării EU:C:2013:275. 
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scope of the prohibition of direct discrimination even in the absence of identified victims.69 In 
ACCEPT, an important shareholder of a major football team in Romania had declared in public 
that he would not want any gay football player in his team. The CJEU decided that these 
statements could amount to discrimination because “it may be inferred [from them] that [the 
club] has a discriminatory recruitment policy”.70 In Feryn, the director of a major company 
selling and installing doors had publicly stated that he would not employ immigrants because 
the company’s clients would be reluctant to give them access to their houses for installation 
purposes. The Court found that the public statement at stake could amount to discrimination 
because they had the effect of deterring potential job applicants from ethnic minority 
background from applying. 71  It is notable that these cases extend the protection against 
discrimination to situations of dissuasion that exclude certain groups from given job 
opportunities even prior to the selection process, even without identifiable complainants.72 
Since recital 8 of the Race Equality and the Employment Equality Directives states that their 
aim is “to foster conditions for a socially inclusive labour market” and “to foster a labour market 
favourable to social integration”, it could be argued by analogy that stereotyping based on 
protected grounds in the advertising of jobs, which de facto results in excluding certain groups 
from certain job opportunities, could be considered discriminatory.73 In fact, such algorithmic 
stereotyping not only influences online users’ representations in terms of career opportunities 
through reinforcing prejudice through the phenomenon of “echo chambers”; it also affects the 
real-world distribution of job opportunities, thereby maintaining segregation and inequality in 
the labour market.74 
 
Furthermore, the use of algorithms in the distribution of labour also risk directly reproducing 
and reifying biased preferences and harmful stereotypes by systematically offering less work 
opportunities to protected minorities on the basis of users’ ratings and evaluations. For instance, 
a study by Hannák et al. shows that “perceived gender and race are significantly correlated with 
worker evaluations” on online platforms, “which could harm the employment opportunities 
afforded to the workers”. 75  Algorithms in fact use “rating and review data to power 
recommendation and search systems”, therefore allowing customers’ prejudices to affect the 
automated distribution of work.76 Under the guise of maximising efficiency, machine learning 
                                               
69 See ibid. 
70 ACCEPT [49]. 
71 Feryn [25]. 
72 In this sense, see ACCEPT [45] and [52] : “It is irrelevant in that regard that […] the system of recruitment […] 
is not based on a public tender or direct negotiation following a selection procedure requiring the submission of 
applications" and “the fact that a professional football club might not have started any negotiations with a view to 
recruiting a player presented as being homosexual does not preclude the possibility of establishing facts from 
which it may be inferred that that club has been guilty of discrimination”. See also Feryn [23]. 
73 This reasoning also applies to the Gender Recast Directive, of which recital 11 states that “marked gender 
segregation on the labour market” should be addressed. 
74 See Kay, Matuszek and Munson, 'Unequal Representation and Gender Stereotypes in Image Search Results for 
Occupations'. See also e.g. Nicholas DiFonzo, ‘The Echo Chamber Effect’, The New York Times (22 April 2011) 
<https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/04/21/barack-obama-and-the-psychology-of-the-birther-
myth/the-echo-chamber-effect> accessed 21 September 2019. 
75 Anikó Hannák and others, Bias in Online Freelance Marketplaces: Evidence from TaskRabbit and Fiverr 
(2017). 
76 Ibid, 1915. 
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algorithms might end up aggravating structural inequalities through “misrecognition” and 
“maldistribution” by relying on biased input data.77 As stated in the previous section, the fact 
that EU non-discrimination law does not accept customers’ prejudices as a valid justification 
for discrimination could be used as a basis to challenge such types of discrimination, provided 
that these situations fall within the scope of employment.78 
 
These are but some examples of how algorithmic discrimination may collide with and be 
captured by EU non-discrimination law. Similar problems could arise in various other 
employment-related fields which the non-discrimination directives cover, such as the access to 
social security, vocational training, redundancy schemes, etc. EU non-discrimination law offers 
quite some potential to address algorithmic discrimination occurring in the labour market, both 
when it comes to protected grounds and groups as well as protected fields (access to 
employment, employment conditions and pay). This is further supported by the horizontal 
direct effects recognized by the Court of Justice to the principle of non-discrimination in the 
jurisprudential series spanning Mangold, Kücükdeveci, Dansk Industri and Egenberger. 79 
However, this protective potential would need to be confirmed by the Court of Justice, a task 
which will require some interpretive creativity to adapt existing regulations to digital forms of 
discrimination. 
 
II. 2. The provision and supply of goods and services 
 
In the case of the consumption and supply of goods and services, EU non-discrimination law 
offers a much more limited protection. In the absence of a so-called ‘Horizontal Directive’80 
covering all discrimination grounds, its personal scope is restricted to the grounds of sex and 
race or ethnic origin as laid down in Directive 2004/113/EC and 2000/43/EC. In addition, the 
material scope of this protection might be constrained by a number of exceptions in national 
transposing laws.81 While the absence of horizontal protection is a problem per se in this area, 
it becomes exacerbated in light of the risks linked to algorithmic discrimination. Quite 
paradoxically, the area of goods and services is where algorithmic discrimination could 
potentially have its greatest and gravest impact. Discrimination in this field can take a number 
of forms.  
 
II.2.1 Structural misrepresentation in the access to goods and services 
                                               
77  See Axel Honneth and Nancy Fraser, Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange 
(Verso 2004). 
78 See Bougnaoui [2017]. 
79 C-144/04 Werner Mangold v Rüdiger Helm EU:C:2005:709; C-555/07 Seda Kücükdeveci v Swedex GmbH & 
Co. KG EU:C:2010:21; C-441/14 Dansk Industri (DI) contre Succession Karsten Eigil Rasmussen 
EU:C:2016:278; C-414/16 Vera Egenberger v Evangelisches Werk für Diakonie und Entwicklung e.V. 
EU:C:2018:257. See further section IV and also Raphaële Xenidis, 'Transforming EU Equality Law? On 
Disruptive Narratives and False Dichotomies' (2019) Yearbook of European Law . 
80 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment 
between persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation COM(2008) 426 final. 
81 See Eugenia Caracciolo di Torella and Bridgette McLellan, Gender equality and the collaborative economy 
(European Commission, 2018). 
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The problem of algorithmic discrimination already starts at the stage of data collection. Data 
collected to train algorithms might exclude some portions of the population. This can result in 
lesser performance of ensuing algorithms in relation to the groups excluded. Unavailability or 
underperformance of goods and services, based on these algorithms, fitting the needs of women, 
racialised, religious and sexual minorities, the elderly or people living with disabilities can 
prove extremely discriminatory. For instance while AI applications are more and more used in 
the healthcare sector, the issue of under-representation of women and racialised minorities in 
data used to train algorithms becomes important. Health services that do not take into 
consideration the specific needs of women and minorities, who might suffer from different 
issues or exhibit different symptoms compared to the white male population which research 
primarily focuses on, might discriminate in their availability or performance.82 Many more 
fields than healthcare services are concerned by this issue, e.g. housing, driving, etc.83 Such 
discrimination could fall under the scope of Directive 2004/113/EC for gender and 2000/43/EC 
for race or ethnic origin. In fact, recital 17 of the Gender Goods and Services Directive states 
that “[t]he principle of equal treatment in the access to goods and services does not require that 
facilities should always be provided to men and women on a shared basis, as long as they are 
not provided more favourably to members of one sex”. 
 
II.2.2 Algorithmic stereotyping in advertising 
Algorithmic discrimination is also likely to take place in advertising services, for instance on 
platforms that use algorithms to match providers and buyers, in particular in ad targeting and 
delivery on the consumption market. Optimisation and personalisation of ads and ad delivery 
rely on the gathering of personal data by online platforms and third parties and the profiling of 
users based on their personal characteristics. As Ali et al. show, “significant skew in delivery 
[take place] along gender and racial lines for ‘real’ ads for [inter alia credit and] housing 
opportunities despite neutral targeting parameters”. 84  Gendered and racial skews are for 
example observed in relation to housing ads on Facebook.85 This might be because advertisers 
themselves target the ads at certain audiences, or because ad delivery services match ads and 
audiences based on their profile, interests and the success rates of past ads. The second scenario 
is particularly worrisome because it entails that “some users [are] less likely than others to see 
particular ads based on their demographic characteristics” even when “advertisers set their 
targeting parameters to be highly inclusive”.86 For instance, it has been shown that ads which 
target the same audience might be distributed to highly differentiated users based on ad delivery 
services’ stereotypical assumptions about their content and images, for instance cultural 
stereotypes leading to racial profiling or gender stereotypes leading to sex-based targeting.87 
                                               
82 See e.g. Oras A Alabas and others, 'Sex Differences in Treatments, Relative Survival, and Excess Mortality 
Following Acute Myocardial Infarction: National Cohort Study Using the SWEDEHEART Registry' (2017) 6 
Journal of the American Heart Association . 
83 See e.g. Caroline Criado Perez, Invisible Women: Data Bias in a World Designed for Men (Abrams Press, New 
York 2019). 
84 Ali and others, 'Discrimination through optimization: How Facebook's ad delivery can lead to skewed outcomes', 
1. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid, 2. 
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Algorithmic stereotyping of images and content leading to gendered and racial differentiation 
in ad exposure might lead to discrimination through offering less opportunities to certain 
groups, but also through reinforcing harmful stereotyping. Beside optimisation in delivery, 
economic considerations alone will lead low budget ads to be shown to less valuable audiences 
(for instance men) while high budget ads will be shown to audiences that are more demanded 
because considered more attractive (for instance women), which might lead to discrimination 
when these audiences correlate with protected categories such as gender.88 
 
The problem is that EU non-discrimination law covers advertising only in a restricted way, 
given the existence of a so-called hierarchy of grounds and the lack of agreement on the pending 
proposal for a Horizontal Directive evening the level of protection for all grounds. 89 
Advertising is excluded from the scope of the Gender Goods and Services Directive, therewith 
allowing for gender-targeting ads.90 The Race Equality directive however remains silent on this 
point, thus potentially outlawing race-based advertising for goods and services in the EU. Other 
grounds are not covered in the ambit of the consumption market. The protection EU law offers 
in this field is therefore insufficient and risks allowing algorithmic stereotyping reinforcing 
existing symbolic and structural inequalities. In addition, other obstacles arise linked to the 
application of EU non-discrimination law. In cases where commercial offers are highly 
personalised, establishing discrimination might be an issue. Hacker has for instance expressed 
doubts regarding whether such personalised products or services would fall under the definition 
of “goods and services which are available to the public” mentioned in Art. 3(1)(h) of the Race 
Equality Directive and Art. 3(1) of the Gender Goods and Services Directive.91  
 
II.2.3 Algorithmic price discrimination  
Another configuration of algorithmic discrimination on the goods and services markets 
translates in price discrimination. Big data and the availability of information based on 
individual characteristics such as “location, age, gender, employment status” or behavioural 
observations (e.g. consumer behavior, search histories, etc.) offer companies new possibilities 
to “mine consumers’ digital footprints, using machine learning algorithms to enable digital 
retailers to predict the price that individual consumers (‘final end users’) are willing to pay for 
particular items, and thus offer them different prices”.92 Targeting can thus lead to differentiated 
prices based on protected categories such as gender and ethnic background. A major concern is 
                                               
88 Ali and others, 'Discrimination through optimization: How Facebook's ad delivery can lead to skewed outcomes'. 
89 On the Horizontal Directive, see Proposal for a Council Directive on implementing the principle of equal 
treatment between persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation COM(2008)0426 
final. On the issue of a hierarchy of grounds, see e.g. Erica Howard, 'The Case for a Considered Hierarchy of 
Discrimination Grounds in EU Law' (2006) 13 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 445. The 
term refers to the unequal scope of protection afforded to grounds of discrimination, with the widest scope for race 
or ethnic origin (employment, goods and services, social protection and education), followed by gender 
(employment, social security, goods and services) and then age, sexual orientation, disability and religion or belief 
(employment). 
90 See Art 3(3) of Directive 2004/113/EC : “This Directive shall not apply to the content of media and advertising 
nor to education”. 
91 Philipp Hacker, 'Teaching fairness to artificial intelligence: Existing and novel strategies against algorithmic 
discrimination under EU law' (2018) 55 Common Market Law Review. 
92 Christopher Townley, Eric Morrison and Karen Yeung, 'Big Data and Personalized Price Discrimination in EU 
Competition Law' (2017) 36 Yearbook of European Law 683, 684 and 688. 
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“that ACPD [algorithmic consumer price discrimination] may result in a form of social sorting, 
with some groups routinely discriminated against, particularly on the basis of gender, race, or 
geographic location”.93 Algorithmic price discrimination could thus enhance existing patterns 
of discrimination in pricing, for instance gender-based pricing, and entail higher costs or lacking 
supply for some protected categories. 
 
EU non-discrimination law prohibits pricing on the basis of gender and race or ethnic origin 
through Directives 2004/113/EC and 2000/43/EC. This has been confirmed by the Court of 
Justice in the already mentioned Test-Achats case outlawing the use of gender as an actuarial 
factor in insurance policy pricing.94 However, unclarities remain regarding the application of 
existing legislation to other types of goods and services. In addition, other protected grounds 
are not covered in this field, so that price discrimination based on sexual orientation, disability, 
religion or belief and age would not be unlawful under EU law. Moreover, other types of price 
discrimination, for instance based on socio-economic resources which is not a protected ground 
in the EU equality framework, might also occur, facilitated by machine-learning algorithms. 
Algorithms therefore more than ever pose the question of the boundaries between prohibited 
discrimination and discrimination not (yet) covered by the law, in particular on the consumption 
market. The legal framework seems to fall short in effectively tackling algorithmic 
discrimination on the consumption market because of its limitation both in terms of protected 
grounds and areas that are excluded from its scope. 
 
This section has provided some examples of algorithmic discrimination, which illustrate how 
algorithms pose an increased risk of discrimination in some configurations. It has highlighted 
the risks linked to the hierarchy of equality protection offered by EU law, with race equality 
enjoying the broadest scope of protection, followed by gender equality, while the protection on 
other grounds of discrimination – disability, religion or belief, sexual orientation and age –  
does not apply to goods and services at all.95   
 
 
III. Conceptual challenges, uncertainties and limits of EU non-discrimination 
law in the digital era 
 
The examples above illustrate how the problem of algorithmic discrimination and its many 
forms raise questions regarding the scope and application of EU non-discrimination law. This 
section zooms in on the two main conceptual tools contained in EU non-discrimination law: 
direct discrimination and indirect discrimination. A preliminary challenge is that, depending on 
the context and on whether the focus is on the algorithmic operation itself or the inclusion of 
its output in the decision-making process of a human operator, discrimination can be conceived 
                                               
93 Ibid, 719. 
94  C-236/09 Association Belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL and Others v Conseil des ministres 
EU:C:2011:100. 
95 See e.g. Lisa Waddington and Mark Bell, 'More Equal than Others: Distinguishing European Union Equality 
Directives' (2001) 38 Common Market Law Review 587 and Erica Howard, 'The Case for a Considered Hierarchy 
of Grounds in EU Law' (2006) 13 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 445. 
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as either direct or indirect. The co-involvement of humans and machines in decision-making 
processes makes it difficult to classify discrimination strictly as differential treatment or 
disproportionate disadvantage given the complexity of decision-making chains. Questions arise 
as to which steps a discrimination analysis should focus on: the scoring process by an algorithm 
or as the case may be the incorporation of such scoring in final decisions by a human operator? 
The boundaries between the concepts of direct and indirect discrimination are therefore blurred 
in the context of algorithmic discrimination. Hence, as Kim puts forward, a “mechanical 
application of [the] existing doctrine will fail to address the real sources of bias when 
discrimination is data-driven”.96  
 
III.1 Direct discrimination: a sound conceptual basis with limited applicability? 
Direct discrimination is defined in EU law as a situation in which “one person is treated less 
favourably than another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation”.97 In the 
context of algorithms, direct discrimination captures situations where models are not neutral in 
relation to a protected ground. If any element of an algorithmic rule or code is not neutral 
towards a protected ground, the result will fall under the concept of direct discrimination. This 
can be the case, for instance, when a protected ground is directly inputted in an algorithmic 
model as a relevant variable and treated as a negative factor.  
 
One of the strengths of EU non-discrimination law in this context is the irrelevance of intent. 
This feature of EU non-discrimination law separates the debate from US legal analyses of 
discrimination, where the notions of ‘motive’ and ‘intent’ are central to a finding of so-called 
‘disparate treatment’.98  Whether a protected ground was treated differently as a result of 
intention or not does not matter in EU law, which potentially allows the concept of direct 
discrimination to capture a broad range of situations where protected grounds would be used as 
relevant variables by an algorithmic model even though it was not the programmers’ intention 
to discriminate. 
 
However, since developers strive for accuracy, cases of direct discrimination will be rather rare 
because directly inputting discrimination in an algorithmic model is likely to reduce its 
predictive value, which constitutes an important disincentive.99  In addition, awareness of legal 
obligations is generally well established with regard to the ban on directly treating protected 
groups differently. Despite the rareness, one risk which the concept of direct discrimination 
would cover, however, is the concealing of discrimination under the veneer of neutrality.100 In 
sum, if the concept of direct discrimination is fit to capture certain situations of algorithmic 
discrimination, its relevance is likely to be less important than that of indirect discrimination.  
 
                                               
96 See Kim, 'Data-Driven Discrimination at Work', 866, 869, 908. 
97 E.g. Art. 2(2)(a) Directive 2000/43/EC. 
98 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
99  See Hacker, 'Teaching fairness to artificial intelligence: Existing and novel strategies against algorithmic 
discrimination under EU law', 1152. 
100 This is what Barocas and Selbst call “masking”. See Barocas and Selbst, 'Big Data's Disparate Impact'. 
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Issues of proof of differential treatment of these groups are however likely to complicate 
victims’ task of proving direct discrimination. Machine learning processes are often described 
as ‘black boxes’ in light of the difficulties in understanding whether the parameters of an 
algorithmic model are neutral towards protected categories.101 In particular, the opacity of such 
models to laypersons, but also the proprietary nature of certain commercial algorithms and the 
ensuing lack of disclosure, make it difficult for lawyers and judges alike to understand what is 
in the box and whether it is discriminatory. In addition, the CJEU established in Meister that a 
right to recruitment information does not exist vis-a-vis an employer, even though the 
company’s refusal to provide such information could count as an element towards the 
establishment of a prima facie case of discrimination.102 By analogy, Meister does not place 
applicants in an easy situation when it comes to accessing information about a suspect 
algorithm. Finally, performing the comparison-based test inherent in non-discrimination law 
might be a challenge for judges in light of this lack of transparency.103 To establish direct 
discrimination, judges in general select real or hypothetical comparators and examine whether 
the protected group at stake has been treated in a differential way by the algorithmic model. 
Establishing algorithmic direct discrimination might thus be complicated because of the above-
mentioned hurdles. 
 
III.2 Indirect discrimination: a broader reach but more justifications  
Indirect discrimination is likely to capture many situations of algorithmic discrimination. It 
refers to situations ‘where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put 
[members of a protected category] at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons, 
unless that provision, criterion or practice is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the 
means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary’.104 In the words of McCrudden and 
Prechal, “[i]ndirect discrimination prohibits practices that formally apply to all from having the 
effect of disadvantaging individuals of particular protected groups, unless those practices can 
be shown to be objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim 
are appropriate and necessary”.105 Two elements of the concept of indirect discrimination make 
it particularly relevant to algorithmic discrimination. First, on the surface the treatment of 
protected groups is neutral. This allows capturing a wide array of situations in which algorithms 
do not operate on the basis of protected groups directly, and even situations where algorithms 
were made explicitly blind to these groups so that they are not picked as relevant variables. 
Indirect discrimination seems fit to capture a large spectrum of apparently neutral but indeed 
discriminatory algorithmic outputs, for instance situations in which training data is biased 
towards certain groups (under- or over-inclusion), the phenomenon of ‘redundant encoding’ 
through which structural discrimination is reproduced by algorithmic models, as well as proxy 
                                               
101 See Pasquale, The black box society : the secret algorithms that control money and information. 
102 C-415/10 Galina Meister v Speech Design Carrier Systems GmbH EU:C:2012:217. 
103 Exceptions to the comparability requirement exist, e.g. in the context of pregnancy discrimination: C-177/88 
Elisabeth Johanna Pacifica Dekker v Stichting Vormingscentrum voor Jong Volwassenen (VJV-Centrum) Plus 
EU:C:1990:383. 
104 E.g. Art. 2(2)(b) Directive 2000/43/EC. 
105 Christopher McCrudden and Sacha Prechal, The Concepts of Equality and Non-Discrimination in Europe: A 
practical approach (2009), 35. 
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discrimination in which variables which correlate with a protected ground are used as relevant 
features or labels in an algorithm.  
 
Furthermore, the concept of indirect discrimination allows shifting the focus of the analysis 
onto the effects of algorithms, instead of their rules, parameters and content. By the same token, 
it shifts the analysis from the perpetrator of discrimination to the victims.106 There is no need 
to know exactly how an algorithm operates, rather, what is relevant to the case is only its 
discriminatory impact. Not having to open the ‘black box’ is likely to be an advantage for 
victims of discrimination. In that perspective, the focus of the concept of indirect discrimination 
on the group affected by the discriminatory measure rather than on the individual applicant 
might also be a better conceptual fit with the way algorithms operate.  
 
The concept of indirect discrimination could also provide a safety net in case no direct 
discrimination can be found in light of difficulties of proof regarding the non-neutrality of 
algorithmic rules. Establishing a prima facie case of indirect discrimination might, in some 
cases, be easier for applicants. In fact, testing and measuring algorithmic output could prove 
easier than measuring the effect of a neutral rule in a human setting, so that statistics (even if 
not required to establish indirect discrimination in EU law) could represent an easily available 
means of evidence. Current discussions focus on how algorithmic auditability, that is the 
possibility that algorithms are checked, reviewed and monitored by third parties, could facilitate 
such measures.107 That said, access to this information in the context of proprietary algorithms 
could pose further problems.108 
 
Once a prima facie case of indirect discrimination is established, the burden of proof shifts onto 
the defendant. This provision, applied to algorithmic discrimination, places the burden on the 
providers of algorithm-based services (e.g. employers, service providers, etc.) to demonstrate 
that their algorithm is not discriminatory. EU rules on the burden of proof strengthen applicants’ 
position. However, it has been argued that the strength of the concept of indirect discrimination 
is compromised by the specific challenges posed by the possibility of objective justification in 
the context of algorithms.109 Indeed, a third dimension of the concept of indirect discrimination 
is the possibility for it to be objectively justified within the ambit of a proportionality test.110 
First, the discriminatory output of the algorithm at stake must serve a legitimate aim. This is an 
easy step for defendants as the use of algorithmic models in itself will serve legitimate business 
purposes (e.g. ranking or scoring algorithms to find out which employees are most performant, 
                                               
106 See Alan David Freeman, 'Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical 
Review of Supreme Court Doctrine' (1978) 62 Minnesota Law Review 1049. 
107 See Rumman Chowdhury and Narendra Mulani, 'Auditing Algorithms for Bias' Harvard Business Review 
(<https://hbr.org/2018/10/auditing-algorithms-for-bias?referral=03758&cm_vc=rr_item_page.top_right>. 
108 See discussion in the next section (IV). 
109 See Hacker, 'Teaching fairness to artificial intelligence: Existing and novel strategies against algorithmic 
discrimination under EU law'. 
110  See C-170/84 Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v Karin Weber von Hartz EU:C:1986:204; C-96/80 J.P. Jenkins v 
Kingsgate (Clothing Productions) Ltd. EU:C:1981:80; C-127/92 Dr. Pamela Mary Enderby v Frenchay Health 
Authority and Secretary of State for Health EU:C:1993:859. To be justified, a measure or practice shall be 
“objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim [must be] appropriate and necessary”. 
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estimating a default risk, etc.).111 If the aim is found to be legitimate, the measure at stake also 
needs to be deemed appropriate and necessary, that is effective and proportionate. In cases of 
algorithms, it is likely that courts accept that they are effective means to the aim of making 
accurate predictions and the like.112 Algorithms are in fact developed precisely to ensure a level 
of precision and granularity that human minds are not able to reproduce. Hence, the 
requirements of a legitimate aim and the appropriateness of an algorithm meeting that aim are 
likely to be satisfied. 
 
However, following the last prong of the proportionality test conducted by the CJEU — the 
necessity requirement — there must be “no other means of achieving [the same] aim that 
imposes less of an interference with the right to non-discrimination”.113 By contrast to other 
academic views, we contend that the Court of Justice is less likely to accept broad justifications 
for this last part of the proportionality test.114 The recent Achbita case also points towards a 
rejection of blanket measures by the Court and an acceptation of more narrowly tailored policies 
or practices.115 In this case, the Court examined whether employees’ prohibition to wear a 
religious sign in the form of a hijab was a blanket ban or limited to those workers who sustained 
interactions with the clients. 116  Only the second situation could fulfil the necessity 
requirements. By analogy, in case of algorithmic discrimination, the question is likely to 
become one about the trade-off between business efficiency and non-discrimination. This will 
call for a balancing act between accuracy and equality. Hence indirect discrimination seems 
conceptually fit to tackle a large spectrum of issues, but its application appears challenging, 
thus calling into question whether it will provide a systematic redress against algorithmically 
induced discrimination. 
 
In addition to these frictions, situations of algorithmic discrimination could be conceived of as 
either direct or indirect discrimination depending on whether the algorithmic operation itself is 
considered or its application in decision-making (depending on whether the decision-making 
process involves a human supervisor). Distinguishing between the two concepts might not 
always be a clear-cut case given the complexity of the human-machine relationship and the 
fragmentation of algorithmic decision-making systems. Frontiers between direct and indirect 
discrimination might become blurred in certain configurations. Responding to the critique that 
                                               
111 See e.g. Hacker, 'Teaching fairness to artificial intelligence: Existing and novel strategies against algorithmic 
discrimination under EU law', 1161. 
112 See ibid. 
113  European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and Council of Europe, Handbook on European non-
discrimination law (European Union and Council of Europe, 2018), 45. 
114 See e.g. Hacker, 'Teaching fairness to artificial intelligence: Existing and novel strategies against algorithmic 
discrimination under EU law'. 
115 See C-157/15 Samira Achbita and Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding v G4S 
Secure Solutions NV EU:C:2017:203, [42]: ‘As regards, in the third place, the question whether the prohibition at 
issue in the main proceedings was necessary, it must be determined whether the prohibition is limited to what is 
strictly necessary. In the present case, what must be ascertained is whether the prohibition on the visible wearing 
of any sign or clothing capable of being associated with a religious faith or a political or philosophical belief covers 
only G4S workers who interact with customers. If that is the case, the prohibition must be considered strictly 
necessary for the purpose of achieving the aim pursued.’ 
116 Despite the contestable nature of the reasoning and outcome in Achbita, the CJEU shows a refusal to accept 
blanket bans as necessary. 
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“the rules governing indirect discrimination may be noticeably more flexible than those relating 
to direct discrimination”, AG Sharpston indicated in Bougnaoui that “[i]t might be objected that 
the application of the rules laid down by EU law to the latter category is unnecessarily rigid and 
that some ‘blending’ of the two categories would be appropriate”.117 In addition to this, another 
issue arises in case algorithms are used to disguise direct discrimination. If used to conceal 
intentional discrimination, algorithms could engender so-called covert direct discrimination, 
but such a configuration would be even harder to prove and would probably be treated as 
indirect discrimination by the CJEU.118 Finally, the enforcement of EU non-discrimination law 
might also prove challenging, a problem which the next section tackles in detail. 
 
IV. Enforcement challenges: a need to rethink the application of EU non-
discrimination law? 
 
Ensuring compliance with and securing enforcement of the EU non-discrimination principle in 
relation to algorithmic discrimination might be problematic for various reasons. First of all, 
conceiving the fundamental right to equality as the other side of the coin of the non-
discrimination principle, one can distinguish two main ways of enforcement: the individual 
rights-based approach, relying upon private individuals bringing claims to court, and the 
monitoring, supervisory approach, relying upon a variety of public institutions, tools and 
mechanisms to take the necessary action to implement and enforce equality. Both ways reveal 
hurdles and weaknesses, which cast doubt on whether current enforcement mechanisms of EU 
non-discrimination law are fit to tackle algorithmic discrimination. We identify the most 
pressing enforcement issues below and unpack the challenges they pose for the future. 
 
IV.1 The individual rights-based approach 
For a long time, the prevalent mechanism for enforcing rights deriving from EU law has been 
the initiation of national court proceedings. The Court of Justice’s recognition of the supremacy 
of EU [then EEC] law and of its direct effect has been key to this individual approach to 
enforcement.119 Citizens have played a very important role in tackling discrimination and in 
bringing about norms regarding the effective judicial protection of their right to equality. 
National courts have by now turned to the CJEU in hundreds of cases, with a duty to leave aside 
any national rule of law conflicting with EU law. A striking, early example of this process is 
the case of Mrs Defrenne, who made a significant contribution to the development and 
enforcement of the equal pay principle by bringing various cases to the national court in 
Belgium, leading in turn to three preliminary references to the CJEU.120 We take the Defrenne 
                                               
117 Opinion of AG Sharpston, Asma Bougnaoui and Association de défense des droits de l’homme (ADDH) v 
Micropole SA, 13 July 2016 EU:C:2016:553, [65]. 
118 On the concept of covert direct discrimination, see Oddny Mjöll Arnadóttir, Equality and Non-Discrimination 
under the European Convention on Human Rights, vol 74 (Kluwer Law International 2003). 
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cases as our lead example to illustrate the problems that emerge with the individual rights based 
approach in relation to algorithmic discrimination. 
 
As stated above, a first major issue concerns the actual identification of algorithmic 
discrimination. How to overcome the lack of transparency in the nature and effects of 
algorithms? How can victims and lawyers establish evidence of discrimination in light of 
algorithms’ technological and technical complexity? While the CJEU indicated in Meister that 
a private employer is not required to disclose information regarding the recruitment process, it 
also established in a consistent line of case law that transparency is a precondition for the 
effective enforcement of the non-discrimination principle. 121  Tackling the problem of 
differential treatment in retirement age and pension calculations, the Court required in Danfoss 
that job classification systems be transparent and that employees be entitled to access 
information as to how pay structures are set up and tasks and functions evaluated.122 Without 
transparency, female employees may in fact not even be aware that they are being discriminated 
against. As a consequence, even though the CJEU has sent contradictory signals, one could 
argue that basic transparency, openness and disclosure requirements need to apply to 
algorithmic models to enable identification of discriminatory practices and effects and to allow 
applicants to make prima facie cases of discrimination. This is all the more relevant in the 
context of current research on auditable algorithms, algorithmic accountability and explainable 
AI, all geared towards enabling a better understanding of how AI operates, enhancing the 
interpretability and increasing the transparency of AI-assisted decision-making.123 
 
In case a prima facie case of discrimination can be established, a second major issue 
nevertheless arises, which concerns how to ensure access to justice. In the digital sphere, a 
variety of problems exist in this regard, which differ from more classic cases such as the 
Defrenne case. To Mrs Defrenne, it was clear that her employer, the airline Sabena, was to be 
brought to court because it was responsible for the infringement of the equal pay principle. In 
relation to algorithmic discrimination, however, the question of liability may be more delicate. 
Is the designer and developer of discriminatory algorithms or the provider who bases its 
services on such algorithms to be held liable?124 A further question concerns the relevant 
jurisdiction: what law governs the conflict that arises between victims of discrimination and 
algorithmic service providers and what court should be turned to? Upon deciding these 
questions, a more fundamental interrogation might arise: is it a realistic and viable strategy for 
citizens to bring a case to court in light of the technical expertise required and the related costs 
incurred?  
 
                                               
121 Meister [2012]. 
122 C-109/88 Handels- og Kontorfunktionærernes Forbund I Danmark v Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening, acting on 
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123 See e.g. Henrik Palmer Olsen, Jacob Livingston Slosser, Thomas Hildebrandt, Cornelius Wiesener, ‘What’s in 
the Box? The Legal Requirement of Explainability in Computationally Aided Decision-Making in Public 
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algorithmes et gouvernance du machine learning : vers une transparence et “explicabilité” des décisions 
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124 See section III.2. on the complexity of the human-machine relationship. 
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A third important problem is that of the restricted invocability of EU equality law according to 
whether the defendant party is a public or private entity. In Defrenne II, the Court decided that 
Article 157 TFEU (ex-Article 119 EEC) can also be invoked vis-à-vis a private employer, 
accepting not only the vertical, but also the horizontal direct effect of this provision. Yet, as 
seen above, many other equality rights in the area of gender, age, race and other grounds have 
only been substantiated in EU directives which in and of themselves lack horizontal direct effect 
and will only apply to private relations after their transposition into national law. While the 
Mangold-Kücükdeveci-Dansk Industri-Egenberger series of case law has established the 
existence of horizontal direct effect in relation to the general principle of non-discrimination 
and Article 21 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, an important question remains 
regarding the extent to which consumers and users of algorithmic services can enforce their EU 
right to equality in light of existing restrictions and the most likely private nature of the legal 
conflicts occurring.125 
 
While not seeking to provide a comprehensive overview and analysis of the drawbacks of the 
individual rights-based approach in non-discrimination law, the above sketch reveals the lack 
of clarity and ensuing insecurity for claimants, which considerably affects the potential success 
of a claim of algorithmic discrimination before courts. Besides, serious question marks must be 
put to the desirability of placing too much emphasis on, and faith in, individuals going to court 
to claim their right to equality. Comparative research on the enforcement of gender equality 
law in the Member States of the EU reveals a multitude of other, persisting problems that deter 
people from initiating legal action to protect their right to equality.126  These range from 
institutional problems (e.g. length of proceedings, lack of expertise and assistance, lack of trust 
in the judiciary, lack of sufficient compensation), financial problems (e.g. cost of proceedings, 
lack of legal aid) to uncertainty about the outcome and fear of victimisation, by the employer, 
family and society.127 The Defrenne series of cases, which lasted over a decade and asked the 
CJEU to rule on different aspects of the equal pay principle on three occasions, is a token of 
the courage and stamina that may be required from citizens who decide to enforce their rights 
and the lawyers who support them.128 Defrenne also shows the limits of an adversarial system 
in relation to the effective protection of equality rights. How realistic is it to expect people to 
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go to court to obtain answers to such a multitude of questions before seeing justice done to their 
case? Even more so, cases like Defrenne have been put to the Court under the preliminary ruling 
procedure of Article 267 TFEU which provides a solution to specific cases only. Similar cases, 
existing and future ones, will only be resolved and ruled out once the legislator makes the 
required amendments to the law. 
 
Algorithmic discrimination thus exacerbates the weaknesses of the individual justice approach 
and forces us to explore other avenues that may reduce the need for going to court in the first 
place. Below we consider the elements of public supervisory approach already in place and 
what this approach can bring for dealing with the case of algorithmic discrimination. 
 
IV.2 The public supervisory approach 
What are currently relevant institutions, procedures and tools available at the public, 
supervisory level that may be put to practice with a view to combatting algorithmic 
discrimination? What are their limits? What other private monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms might be helpful in this regard? 
 
The ‘classic’ EU law mechanism for supervising and enforcing compliance is the infringement 
procedure under Article 258 TFEU, which the European Commission can initiate against non-
compliant Member States. However, an important limitation for acting against algorithmic 
discrimination is that only Member States can be held liable for infringement of non-
discrimination law when EU directives impose obligations that need to be transposed into 
national law. Thus, infringement proceedings cannot be initiated against private actors. Yet, 
while algorithmic discrimination can be a concern in relation to public services and entities129, 
complaints are likely to mostly target private actors. As a consequence, it will be the duty of 
national public bodies to make sure that private actors relying on machine-learning algorithms 
comply with EU non-discrimination law, and these duties would need to be made clear on the 
basis of EU law itself too. Only such national bodies could be held liable by the European 
Commission for not doing so, as opposed to the private actors responsible for algorithmic 
discrimination. Clearly, this mechanism is thus ill-equipped to deal with the issue of algorithmic 
discrimination. 
 
As such, one could say that the enforcement system as it stands today relies heavily not only 
on national courts, but also potentially on national compliance bodies and agencies, especially 
because EU equality law is a domain that so far lacks strong supervisory EU agencies as we 
witness them in other domains of EU law such as financial services, migration, air control, 
chemicals, fisheries etc.130 In these domains, the EU has recognised the limits of the individual 
                                               
129 See e.g. Henrik Palmer Olsen, Jacob Livingston Slosser, Thomas Hildebrandt, Cornelius Wiesener, ‘What’s in 
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rights based approach and instead of merely relying on domestic institutions for the protection 
of EU law rights and obligations, moved towards a more centralised enforcement. In the area 
of equality and non-discrimination, the only agencies in place are the European Institute of 
Gender Equality (EIGE)131 and the Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA),132 whose mandate only 
covers data collection, information, expertise and research. Two questions then impose 
themselves in this regard: which role could these European bodies possibly play in the future 
and which domestic bodies or agencies in particular could be called upon to tackle the problem 
of algorithmic discrimination? To begin with, in our view, EIGE, the FRA and national equality 
bodies could initiate awareness-raising campaigns and conduct studies on the topic of 
algorithmic discrimination. As there is currently little knowledge about algorithmic 
discrimination both among citizens and members of the bar and the judiciary, these campaigns 
and studies would help expose the diverse manifestations of algorithmic discrimination and 
could provide legal practitioners with guidance on building and treating cases of algorithmic 
discrimination. Depending on their mandate, national equality bodies could also play an 
important role in supporting individual claims, initiating class actions and bringing the issue to 
the attention of the legislator. The FRA started to study the impact of artificial intelligence and 
algorithms on fundamental rights in 2018, producing a focus paper entitled ‘#BigData: 
Discrimination in data-supported decision-making’,133 while the EIGE does not yet seem to 
have done so.134 Equinet, the umbrella organisation at EU level for national equality bodies, 
has also recently called for proposals for a study on the equality implications of artificial 
intelligence and the role of equality bodies in tackling algorithmic discrimination.135 The fact 
that the Finnish Presidency of the Council of Europe has organised a conference on this topic 
in February 2019 also shows increasing political awareness. 136  These are positive signals 
regarding public involvement in the near future. 
 
Other legal building blocks might be of crucial importance to ensure the enforcement of non-
discrimination law in the age of machine-learning and AI. Awareness has for instance been 
triggered within the framework of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). This is the 
first piece of European legislation that recognises the phenomenon of algorithmic 
discrimination and sets rules and procedures to combat it, therewith providing a somewhat more 
specific monitoring and enforcement toolkit. In recital 71 of its preamble, it lays down a 
requirement to “implement technical and organizational measures” that “prevent, inter alia, 
discriminatory effects on natural persons on the basis of racial or ethnic origin, political opinion, 
religion or beliefs, trade union membership, genetic or health status or sexual orientation, or 
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that result in measures having such an effect”.137 The Regulation contains two key principles to 
address algorithmic discrimination: data sanitization, concerning the removal of special 
categories from datasets used in automated decision making, and algorithmic transparency, 
entailing a right to explanation.138 The latter entitles data subjects to “meaningful information 
about the logic involved, as well as the significance and the envisaged consequences” when 
automated decision making or profiling takes place. Such information must be provided “in a 
concise, transparent, intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language”.139 
The GDPR further refers to three specific tools by which these principles can be enforced: data 
impact assessments, codes of conduct and certification.140 Therewith the GDPR does not only 
refer to the importance of data protection authorities – and potentially also of the European Data 
Protection Supervisor (EDPS) itself – in carrying out such impact assessment, but it also alludes 
to third-party auditing as a controlling mechanism with a view to certification.141  
The case of data protection thus demonstrates how domestic public institutions in a specific 
area could be imposed such a monitoring and controlling duty, but also how private bodies and 
actors may possibly be engaged in such an exercise. The tools and procedures to be used for 
such purpose are not new as such, but already familiar to, and practised in, several EU law and 
policy domains. Impact assessment is a tool that has been progressively developed for over two 
decades now, and certification is an established instrument in relation to product safety, health 
and environmental inspections. These could be further developed as detection and enforcement 
tools, beyond the area of data protection in the field of equality and non-discrimination. 
Interestingly, we already witness such developments in the Member States, such as the 
Artificial Intelligence Impact Assessment, developed and proposed by the Dutch platform for 
the information society in December 2018.142 Such initiatives can alleviate the burden imposed 
on service and goods providers to check whether the algorithmic models they buy from IT 
engineers are non-discriminatory. Development of third parties such as certification agencies, 
firms or branches in IT companies responsible for ethical questions, which will test algorithms 
for discrimination and certify them, is thus already a viable option within the framework of the 
Union’s current toolbox. Besides the use of impact assessments, the FRA has also emphasised 
the need to involve different experts in oversight, stating that “reviews need to involve 
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being subjected to “decision[s] based solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces legal 
effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her”. 
142 See <https://ictinstitute.nl/the-artificial-intelligence-impact-assessment/>. 
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statisticians, lawyers, social scientists, computer scientists, mathematicians and experts in the 
subject at issue”.143  
As such, quite some avenues could be further explored and developed within the framework of 
an ‘equality by design’ approach, that is an approach to algorithmic engineering that would take 
into account the concerns linked to equality and non-discrimination in each step of the 
algorithmic design and building process, so as to establish a more capable regulatory and 
enforcement framework to deal with algorithmic discrimination.144 
 
V. Conclusions 
 
In this contribution, we have mapped in what ways the use of machine-learning algorithms may 
lead to discrimination and to what extent this may collide with, and be covered by, the current 
EU legal framework. We found that while the body of EU equality law contains useful 
yardsticks to deal with algorithmic discrimination in the field of the labour market and access 
to goods and services, there are also important limitations to it. This is so, amongst others, 
because of discrepancies in the personal and material scope of the EU equality law directives. 
The lack of a coherent and comprehensive equality law framework regarding the various 
grounds of discrimination, including race, gender, religion, disability, sexual orientation and 
age, thus also appears problematic with regard to digital forms of discrimination. Furthermore, 
the complexity of the human-machine relationship might lead to a blurring of the conceptual 
difference between direct and indirect discrimination, as it ensues from the Court’s case law 
and has been consolidated in the EU equality directives. At the level of enforcement, it has 
become clear that existing problems connected to the still strong reliance on the individual 
rights-based approach are exacerbated in relation to algorithmic discrimination. This concerns 
inter alia problems of transparency, access to information, liability, burden of proof and 
effective judicial protection. There is thus a clear need to reflect, in further research, on how to 
effectively address these problems, as well as on which public supervisory mechanisms might 
be put into place to alleviate the burden imposed on individuals affected by such discrimination. 
All in all, the limitations and hurdles contained in the current EU equality law regime are in 
need of a more in-depth analysis, as well as the opportunities it may provide for better tackling 
this new form of digital discrimination. 
 
At the same time, however, it must also be noted that while machine-learning algorithms 
sharpen the risk to see certain types of discrimination flourish, they also reduce the likeliness 
that other kinds of discrimination take place. Hence these new technologies represent both a 
                                               
143  See <https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2018-in-brief-big-data-algorithms-
discrimination_en.pdf>. 
144 On ‘equality by design’ approaches in the platform economy, see e.g. Barzilay and Ben-David, 'Platform 
Inequality: Gender in the Gig-Economy', 430. The authors define equality by design as “the structuring of 
platforms in a manner that is sensitive to prevailing forms of gender discrimination, in ways that extend beyond 
merely omitting gender as a formal element of platforms’ template for profiles or not portraying women in a biased 
manner”.  
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risk and a chance for equality. The question of discrimination should first of all be understood 
not as a fatality inherent in algorithms but rather in the context of a trade-off. As the statistician 
George Box pointed out as early as 1979, “[a]ll models are wrong but some are useful”.145 The 
question is how to conceive of this usefulness and what values to prioritise. In particular, the 
trade off at stake is often one between ease of access, affordability and processability of data, 
accuracy of algorithmic output (e.g. predictions) and ethical considerations such as fairness and 
non-discrimination. The concept of equality by design thereby provides an opportunity for 
decision-makers and legislators to provide clear criteria for weighing in equality and non-
discrimination in the context of this trade off. The challenge of algorithmic discrimination is 
therefore at the same time a chance for expressing a clearer and more concrete commitment to 
equality, and for establishing an operational framework for balancing equality with other 
concerns. 
 
If algorithms enhance discrimination issues in some cases, they also provide an opportunity for 
reduced arbitrariness through increased rationality and explainability in decision-making 
procedures. While human decisions might also be called a “black box” because of their opaque 
and non-replicable nature, machine-learning algorithms offer a chance for more accountable 
decision-making, provided that certain transparency requirements are met.146 Where human 
decisions cannot be reproduced changing one factor to test where discrimination comes from, 
algorithmic decisions might well be replicable in such a way, offering more control on how 
discrimination spreads and reproduces provided that a sufficient level of awareness exists. 
Therefore, certain principles such as transparency, explainability and accountability are 
fundamental to developing artificial intelligence applications if the aim is to turn existing risks 
of discrimination into an opportunity for increased equality. Devising and ensuring that these 
principles are respected along the entire algorithmic design chain will require a holistic 
multidisciplinary approach in which computer scientists, lawyers and social scientists, 
psychologists, sociologists, philosophers, etc. will have to join forces. 
 
                                               
145 George Box, 'Robustness in the strategy of scientific model building' in Robert Launer and Graham Wilkinson 
(eds), Robustness in Statistics (Academic Press 1979) , 202. 
146 See Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society: The Hidden Algorithms Behind Money and Information (Harvard 
University Press 2015). 
